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It has been common practice, until relatively recent times, that by statute,
central banks are required to pursue multiple macroeconomic (and sometime
microeconomic) objectives. These included sustainable growth, high
employment, efficient allocation and use of resources, security of the payments
system, and many other elements that are supposed to guarantee  “economic
progress”. Central banks were also, to large extent, subordinated to
government authority and had a very low level of administrative, target, and
instrumental autonomy. In more recent years many countries have moved,
steadily, towards  granting independence to their central banks. Such
movement has been prompted by the recognition that independence is a crucial
factor supporting the credibility of the institution, which is a precondition for
effectiveness and efficiency of monetary policy.
Together with the spreading of central bank independence, there has been
a tendency to limit the number of objectives that the autonomous central bank
should pursue. In fact, it has been widely claimed that, in order to boost
credibility and to avoid the time inconsistency problem which frequently
affects governments policy decisions, it is necessary to set a single objective
1 Senior Advisor, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, International Monetary
Fund, Walter Rathenau Professor of Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and
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for the central bank,2 and that the single objective should be to attain and to
maintain price stability. This is the corollary of the analytical conception that
monetary policy is best suited to achieve medium-term control over inflation,
while its output, employment, and allocative effects are not regarded as either
predictable or sustainable and, therefore, it would not be feasible to make the
achievement of growth or the lowering of unemployment a realistic monetary
policy objectives. Moreover, it has been broadly accepted that if other
macroeconomic objectives, beyond price stability, are placed within the
explicit responsibility of the central bank, this would tend to wear away central
bank credibility and to weaken its ability to attain its primary objective.
Within this framework, it has become accepted wisdom to curtail, or at least
to minimize, the role that central banks should play in other macroeconomic
policy areas.3 However, current developments in monetary theory, coupled
with the recent practical experience of many and diverse central banks, suggest
that in order to discharge their responsibility, and achieve and preserve
successful macroeconomic stabilization, central banks need to deal with a
myriad of accompanying circumstances within which policies and institutions
develop.
These circumstances, and the rapid evolution of financial markets in recent
times, require that central banks focus, in addition to pursuing their primary
objective, on some additional targets by addressing, with distinctive emphasis,
a number of basic principles of monetary and central banking policies and
analyze their significance for the achievement and the maintenance of
macroeconomic stabilization.
The purpose of this paper is to review, in light of current experience, the
2 Of course, single objectives also facilitate accountability, which is the counterpart
demanded from central banks in exchange for autonomy.
3 In most legal statutes dealing with central bank autonomy there are, of course, qualifiers.
But they tend to be vague and undefined and, in most cases, they ensure that in case of
conflict, price stability takes precedence. For example, the primary objective of the European
Central Bank “shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price
stability, it shall support the general economic policies of the Community.”
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challenges for the central bank arising from  some of these developments.
Section II deals with the question of targeting monetary policy when inflation
has been, indeed, conquered. Section III discusses the importance of ensuring
a sound financial system and the role that central banks have to fulfill in this
regard, relative to the role of the markets. Section IV, discusses the challenges
for monetary policy that arise from the explosion of derivative markets. Section
V summarizes some conclusions.
II. Is there a “Special Monetary Policy for a Low Inflation
Environment?
In a large number of both industrial and emerging economies inflation is
at an historical low and has averaged between 2–3 percent since the beginning
of the 1990s. Several factors have played a role in achieving such performance.
Some of these factors are related to the slack in world economic activity but
the low level of inflation also reflects the generalized understanding on the part
of both policy makers and the public at large, of the economic costs and
distortions caused by run away inflation. This understanding has led to an
unusual effort to attain fiscal consolidation and, to a large extent, to the
unswerving commitment of central banks to the implementation of anti-
inflation monetary policies, in line with the above mentioned widespread
adoption of price stability as the paramount objective of the monetary
authorities.
This situation has elicited a number of interesting issues: Is it desirable—
and feasible—to continue the efforts to attain further disinflation to reach,
preferable, full price stability? And what should be the objectives of monetary
policy within the context of very low inflation?
With respect to the first question, it is evident that it is a matter of cost and
benefits. While the literature on the relative costs of inflation and disinflation
is very rich and well known, it is interesting to dwell on the further specific
costs that may arise from a policy of going from very low to zero inflation.
There are two arguments that have been advanced to assert that it would be
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distinctively costly to move to full price stability. The first category of
arguments deal with the obvious impossibility to set negative nominal interest
rates. The second, with the prevalence of downward nominal wage rigidity.
The interest rate argument relates to the degrees of freedom that a central
bank has when inflation rates are non-zero. The claim is that in these
circumstances, the central bank could compensate for negative exogenous
demand shocks by moving nominal short-term rates below the rate of inflation
in  order  to  stimulate  demand.  Of  course,  the margin for these operations
(i.e., the ability to bring real rates to zero or negative values) is curtailed when
inflation is nil,4 and therefore the central bank is seriously constrained in its
capability to offset negative demand developments.
The wage rigidity proposition claims that in situations of full price stability
there is a strong probability that prices—and particularly some individual
prices—could move into negative territory. A price decline, in the presence of
nominal wage inflexibility would result in higher real wages and they could,
therefore, cause higher unemployment. In fact, it has been claimed that the
natural rate of unemployment will tend to rise at zero inflation since firms could
be hesitant to hire in conditions of uncertainty regarding the behavior of real
wages.5 The relevance of the nominal wage argument fully rests, of course, on
the validity of the wage rigidity assumption. In emerging countries, with large
informal labor markets, wages are probably quite flexible and, as a whole, it
is not unreasonable to assume that even where nominal downward wage
rigidity has been prevalent, labor market may become much more flexible as
inflation falls to zero, and remains at this level for prolonged periods.
Moreover, what is indeed important in terms of employment is the behavior of
4 Notice that the need for some active monetary policy may actually increase when negative
shocks hit at zero inflation. This is so because if the original fall in demand results in
deflationary expectations, real interest rates go up even if nominal rates remain unchanged.
This, of course, strengthen the recessionary impact of the negative shock.
5 See Akerlof, G., W.T. Dickens, and G. L. Perry, “The Macroeconomics of Low Inflation”,
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Volume 1, 1996.
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unit labor costs which, of course, are affected by productivity gains. Even with
rigid wages and price declines, unit labor costs may fall when the rate of
productivity growth is high enough.
The nominal wage argument is, therefore, not very strong. But the
constrains arising from the non-negativity of interest rates pose some dilemma
for central bank policies. In particular, the question is how much is this
constrain actually impairing monetary policy? The answer depends, to a large
extent, on the type of transmission mechanisms assumed to be at play. For
example, if inflation and interest rates are close to zero, interest rates
mechanisms may not be available to affect the decisions of economic agents.
However, monetary policy can still be effective through wealth and exchange
rate effects. An increase in liquidity may affect asset prices, stimulating
demand. Moreover, even without price effects, credit in the economy could
become more easily available if the value of collaterals increase. All this may
have clear expansionary effects. Similarly, monetary policy could result in
expansionary effects by inducing a depreciation of the currency. This, of
course, may not be a feasible policy in the longer run (and could result in a
number of undesirable outcomes) but illustrate the point that, even without
recourse to negative real interest rates, central bank could preserve a degree
of operational freedom in the presence of negligible inflation.
An additional matter is related to the informational content of interest rates.
It is clear that interest rates have been largely regarded as indicators of market
expectations, and central banks tend to observe the behavior of overnight rates
as good indicators of policy stance.6 It is claimed that when interest rates
approach zero levels this mechanism largely vanishes, and the informational
value of interest rates (and of the term structure) is seriously cut down. While
there is a degree of truth in this claim, it is also correct to postulate that, under
these conditions, there are other indicators, such as asset prices, that can be
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utilized to gauge expectations and overall monetary conditions.
From the above considerations, it is possible to assert that the operational
capabilities of the central bank are not severely handicapped by full price
stability and, that even at low levels of inflation, it is worthwhile for central
banks to strive towards the achievement of zero price changes.
III. Market Mechanisms and Banking Soundness:  Disclosure or
Central Bank Regulation?
Although banking crises are by no means a new phenomenon, the recent
increase in the incidence of financial instability and their close relationship
with overall macroeconomic developments have make the objective of
protecting the soundness of the banking system a central goal of government
policy, and therefore a subject of particular attention in the discussions
surrounding the assignment of functions and responsibilities to a central bank
concerned with the preservation of macroeconomic stability.
The concept usually utilized to gauge the potential instability of a banking
system is the degree of its soundness. A sound banking system is deemed to
be stable because it can withstand well unexpected shocks and radical policy
changes. Soundness, in turn, is specified as a situation  in which the majority
of banks are solvent and, unless very extreme adverse events take place, are
likely to stay so. Since solvency is defined as a positive difference between
assets and liabilities, i.e., a positive net worth, unsoundness, and therefore,
instability, arises when there is high likelihood that negative occurrences could
affect banks’ assets and liabilities in a manner that erodes, or even erases, their
net worth, rendering the banks insolvent. In other words, instability arises from
the risk of insolvency and, in order to trace the sources of instability, it is
necessary to investigate the sources of insolvency.
In general, it is possible to say that the likelihood of a banking system to be
solvent, and to remain so, depends largely of banks being profitable and
adequately capitalized. Unprofitable banks would not be able to maintain
liquidity, would lose their ability to attract deposits, net flow of funds would
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turn negative, and, since they cannot conduct normal business, they would
become insolvent. Undercapitalized banks, i.e., banks with low net worth,
would be unstable because they would be more susceptible to fail in the
presence of even moderate negative shocks (such as unexpected asset price
adjustments) or policy changes (including financial sector liberalization).
From the above, one can conclude that, assessing the sources of insolvency
and instability, amounts to assessing the factors that affect profitability and that
reduce the capital of banking institutions. A very long list could, indeed, be
composed if a comprehensive attempt is made to identify all these factors.
However, in very general terms, one could state that unsoundness of a financial
system depends largely on macroeconomic conditions (that affect, directly or
indirectly, bank profitability and impinge on the value of bank’s capital),7 but
also depends, to a large extent, on the specific manner in which the financial
sector is organized and on the arrangements that systematize and regulates its
proper functioning. While the role of macroeconomic factors in promoting and
preserving financial stability is well known and has received copious
attention,8 the second aspect, i.e., the institutional arrangements, has received
less attention despite the fact that it is of no less importance.
These organizational aspects are the focus of this section, that concentrates,
in particular, on the debate about the merits of the two possible available
arrangements that have been suggested in order to advance and to ensure the
prudent behavior of the banking sector. The first type of arrangement is based
in pure market mechanisms trusting that they would guarantee the proper
7As a whole, it is correct to say that banks are “mirror” institutions since the strength of a
bank’s balance sheet reflects the strengths of bank’s clients, which in turn reflects the health
of the economy as a whole. It is therefore feasible to postulate methodical connections
between variables that affect the strength of the aggregate economy, and in particular
macroeconomic variables, and indicators of bank solvency and vulnerability. Thus, the
performance of  macroeconomic factors could be seen as an indicator that may contribute to
the appraisal of the stability of a banking sector and to predict its degree of vulnerability.
8 See, for example, Lindgren, Carl, Gillian Garcia, and Mathew Saal (1996), Bank
Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
111JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
conduct of banking business. The alternative approach relies heavily on public
regulation and on central bank intervention. The view that emanates clearly
from the discussion here is that the two alternatives are not substitutes but
rather complements. Moreover, there are reasons for suggesting that, beyond
direct central bank intervention, there is the need for the official setting of an
appropriate framework for the market mechanism to fulfill its disciplinary
potential.
A. Trusting Market Mechanisms
The school of thought that maintain that no intervention is necessary to
assure financial stability, claims that market forces can be expected to exercise
discipline on financial intermediaries and would tend to recompense capable
financial administration, compensate prudent risk management, and castigate
those that do not perform their tasks in a careful and judicious manner.
However, for this to be true, market mechanisms should operate efficiently, and
this necessitates an appropriate institutional and organizational framework. In
this sense, it is clear that there are preconditions for reliance on market forces.
These preconditions include the availability of appropriate information
systems, the existence and enforcement of a suitable legal framework, and the
development of a mature financial environment that guarantees the evolvement
of proper governance of private-sector institutions (banks and enterprises).
Information systems are indeed crucial. Economic agents have the potential
to enforce market discipline just to the extent that they do have the necessary
information to their disposal, and discipline would lead to efficiency only if the
information is accurate, relevant, and timely. This is particularly true in the
financial area. Therefore, without appropriate information, it cannot be
expected that the market mechanisms would be able to enforce proper
financial-sector management and induce the development of a sound financial
sector. It could be claimed, however, that the market itself, if left undisturbed,
is bound to provide the required  incentives to force market participants to
make available and to divulge to interested parties the pertinent information
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needed for adequate risk assessment. Nevertheless, it has been observed, and
has been abundantly documented, that the system of incentives that should
work to motivate market participants to provide, and to use properly, the
necessary data has been curtailed by a number of factors. These factors include
competitive pressures, the perception of high costs imposed by unilateral
voluntary disclosure, and the pervasiveness of public guarantees.
For these reasons, there is today a wide agreement that there are substantial
arguments to support a mandatory process of enhanced public disclosure and
dissemination of information by financial intermediaries. There is not,
however, consensus regarding the actual implementation of such compulsory
process. There are questions regarding the type of information required, the
standards of reporting, and the mechanism of enforcement. The generalized
view is that central banks cannot elude their responsibility in putting in place
and in coordinating the implementation of a mechanism of this sort they should,
however, leave to the market much of the determination of the adequacy and
the periodicity of the information to be provided. The authorities, however,
should activate a system that secures accuracy of information. Financial
institutions should vouch for the correctness of the data that is made available
and, it is conceivable, that banks could be legally accountable for client’s
damages arising from deceiving information.9
It should be realized, however, that mandatory disclosure is not a costless
process. In addition to the reporting expenses (and the possibility that too much
information could confuse the markets) there are trade-offs between the
amount and quality of the information provided and the preservation of
acquired competitiveness edges of particular institutions. Moreover, the
ultimate usefulness of this mechanism depends on the sophistication of the
agents operating in the market10 and on the paucity of the data provided.
In addition to information, the disciplinary role of the market also depends,
9 This type of liability applies in New Zealand to members of the bank’s board of directors.
10 For most small investors the costs of collecting and processing disclosed information
would probably exceed the benefit.
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largely, on the degree of competition. Elimination of barriers to entry (both for
financial  intermediaries and for wholesale counterparties such as institutional
investors) are a crucial factor in enhancing the disciplinary functions of the
market, which are certainly to be numbed by cartelization at either end of the
spectrum. Of equal importance are the integrity of internal governance
mechanisms. The presence of conglomerates and of far-reaching and intricate
connections between financial institution and of upstream and downstream
linkages between banks and enterprises result in non-transparent structures
that include cross subsidization and other practices that hamper the ability of
the market to appraise the quality of portfolios.
For these reasons,11 and despite the appealing of market-generated
discipline, such mechanism could not be enough by itself (even if enhanced by
mandatory disclosure requirements) to guarantee the preservation of the
financial system soundness. It seems necessary that some type of non-intrusive
official intervention should be put in place to complement, rather than to
replace, the financial order that should be primarily induced by the market.
B. The Roles of Regulation and Direct Intervention
The two traditional mechanisms of government regulation of financial
markets are those directed to diminish the effect of systemic turbulence (safety
nets, including lender of last resort facilities and deposit guarantees) and those
directed to prevent the excessive risk taking of financial institutions (prudential
policies and bank supervision). While the first of these mechanisms, the safety
net,  could be useful to avoid the spreading of financial disruptions and the
eruptions of banking crises, it can also, by protecting institutions and investors
form adverse outcomes, provide perverse incentives regarding  risk assessment
and risk taking. By inducing this type of moral hazard it can, therefore, increase
11 In addition, it is well known that economic agents tend,  in financial markets, to react in
extreme fashions. While they may tend to downplay risks (particularly if herd behavior is
indeed a characteristic of these markets), and to over-react when signs of stress emerge in the
market. This type of behavior heighten the costs of potential financial crises.
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the risk of unsoundness. For this reason, safety nets cannot be put in place
without appropriate safeguards. The most important of these potential
safeguards is the implementation of prudential regulation and of effective
banking supervision.
Safety nets without a competent prudential framework is not just
counterproductive but also risky and therefore their roles cannot be decoupled.
However, prudential rules should be carefully crafted. Unless aptly conceived
they can result in abusive and excessively intrusive regulations that may impair
efficiency and impede proper competitive practices. These considerations
imply that a safety net is important but it should be limited to a minimum and
should be accompanied by a prudential framework that, while strict, should be
market friendly and complementary with the disciplinary forces of the market.
How to design a market friendly regulatory framework is indeed an
important challenge. The framework should avoid suppressing competitive
forces but, at the same time, should dampen the incentive of unsound
participants to try their fitness in the market. This is indeed the role of licensing
requirement. The central bank could certainly supplement the market by
monitoring ownership structures and demanding that they are as transparent
as feasible. Another area where there is room for complementarities is in the
measurement of risk. Significantly, there is increasing convergence between
market participants and regulators regarding the use of internal models for
assessing market risk. The widespread adoption, and the acceptance by the
regulatory authority, of methodologies such as Value-at-Risk, is a good
example of the shift from minutious and strict regulations toward cooperative
arrangements that place more emphasis on the adequacy of the internal banking
procedures.
IV. Implications of Derivatives Markets for Monetary Policy
Decision
Derivatives developed in the mid–70’s as a response to the increased
volatility of financial markets due to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
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system and to the high and variable inflation that followed the first oil shock.
Higher volatility of interest rates and of exchange rates, coupled with financial
deregulation, generated a demand for financial innovation that was met by
advances in computers and communications technologies. Derivatives
contracts are today an important piece of  risk management technology since
they provide an effective way to control for different forms of market risk
(currency risk, interest rate risk, commodity risk and equity risk) and, to a large
extent, also for credit risk. The existence of derivatives markets, however, has
implications for the design and implementation of monetary policies and
confront central banks with new challenges. With few exceptions,12 these
implications have not been discussed in the literature. The goal of this section
is to discuss briefly how derivatives contracts affect financial markets, and how
their existence changes the financial environment in a manner that should
concern monetary policy makers.
The first point to notice is that the size of derivatives markets is very large,
particularly in industrial countries, and they are expanding rapidly in emerging
countries. The outstanding notional amounts of exchanged traded contracts is
over 50 trillion dollars (more than 10 times the size of all assets in the US
banking sector) as recorded by the Bank of International Settlements. Around
80 percent of all derivatives transactions are carried out in the Over the Counter
(OTC) markets (i.e., by banks) while the rest is undertaken in organized
exchanges. Interest rates and foreign exchange contracts represent more than
90 percent of all derivatives transactions. Foreign exchange derivatives take
place predominantly in OTC markets. The maturity breakdown of contracts is
also relevant: 56 percent of all contracts are up to one year, 34 percent have
matured between one and up to 5 years. Only a remaining 10 percent has a term
longer than 5 years. However, the bias towards short-term contracts is higher
12  See, for example, Hentschel, Ludger and Clifford W. Smith, Jr., “Derivatives Regulation:
Implications for Central Banks,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 40, 1997, pp. 305–
346; and Bank for International Settlements, Macroeconomic and Monetary Policy Issues
Raised by the Growth of Derivative Markets, Basle, 1994.
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in foreign exchange derivatives, since 80 percent of the total is undertaken for
less than one year.
A. Derivatives Contracts and Financial Markets
There is broad consensus that derivatives contracts improve the long-run
efficiency of financial markets. This is due to their ability to control for risk and
adjust it to individual risk-preferences, their role in completing markets and
reducing transactions costs, their provision of forward-looking information to
market participants, including central banks, and their role in improving asset
substitutability. Derivatives allow for the separation of different types of risks,
their independent pricing, and the transfer of risks to those agents that are more
capable of bearing them. Some agents may be more capable of bearing risk than
others because of their preferences, availability of technology, easiness to
hedge, and size of their capital.
Derivatives also enhance liquidity by expending the possibilities for
trading, hedging and investing in financial markets. They do not offer anything
new (i.e.: any pay-off that can be achieved by a derivative can also be achieved
by replicating a portfolio in the cash markets). But derivative markets
contribute to the reduction of transaction costs, e.g., in the case of payoffs that
are nonlinear functions of an underlying asset, options provide a lower cost of
achieving the same pay-off, i.e.: they are responsible for market completion.
Derivatives also make a contribution to reduce information costs. Prices in
forward-type markets summarize market views on the expected values of
interest rates, exchange rates, equities and commodities at various time
horizons; implied volatility in options prices (the volatility “smile”) can be used
to gauge the dispersion of market participants expectations and to predict
possible size of future prices movements associated with a particular
confidence interval. Call/put volume ratios are also used to extract information,
since there is some evidence that when the turnover ratio of call/put options
rises, prices of underlying assets normally start to rise too. The fact that
derivative markets deliver improved and cheaper information can affect
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monetary policy makers in two ways: on the one hand it can be effectively used
by central banks to gauge market sentiment but, on the other hand, it makes it
more difficult for a central bank to implement policy measures that work better
by surprising the public.
Derivatives also increase asset substitutability in domestic and
international markets: traditional derivatives allow to hedge against changes
in exchange rates and interest rates while credit derivatives allow to hedge
against changes in the creditworthiness of the counterparty (including default).
Once those risks are stripped out, assets with the same financial characteristics
(maturity, coupon, frequency of payment of principal) will have a higher degree
of substitutability. Of course, substitutability can never be perfect since
hedging is costly. But at least, it is possible to unbundle the different sources
of risk (foreign exchange, interest rate, default) and to transfer them to another
party.
B. Derivatives Contracts and Monetary Policies
The impact of derivative markets on the conduct of monetary policies could
be analyzed by assessing the importance of these markets during normal
periods and on periods of macroeconomic stress. In normal times, monetary
policy is generally conducted by affecting short-term interest rates; these
variations get transmitted along the complete government term structure and
to other asset prices. The new level of interest rates across the spectrum will
then have an impact on lenders and borrowers decisions regarding
consumption, saving, and investment. The speed by which changes in short-
term interest rates are transmitted to other assets is usually very fast. But the
higher asset substitutability and lower transaction costs implied by the
existence of derivatives markets are expected to increase even more the speed
of monetary transmission while, as discussed above, reduce or eliminate any
surprise effect of interest rates changes.
While the speed of the transmission increases, there are reasons to assert
that the effectiveness of the interest rate channel could be hampered by
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derivatives, beyond the negation of the surprise effect. This is so because
derivatives provide cost effective ways of hedging variations of short-term
interest rates and exchange rates and this may allow planning horizons to be
extended with a larger proportion of plans to be temporarily protected from
short-term variation in interest rates and from exchange rate changes. Clearly,
not all agents can globally escape the consequences of those changes; anyone
seeking to shed risk must find a counterparty willing to bear it. That is to say,
risk can be redistributed but cannot disappear. But it is probably true that
contracts are signed among heterogeneous agents, i.e., agents with different
degrees of risk aversion, different liquidity constraints and different
propensities to spend. If that is the case, the economy response to variations
in short-term interest rates and to changes in exchange rates will be different
depending on the presence and size of derivatives markets that allow to
redistribute risk according to individual preferences.
The above considerations relate to the impact of derivatives in normal
circumstances. During periods of macroeconomic stress, however, derivatives
may exacerbate instability by magnifying short-run price volatility in financial
markets. A classic example is the possibility of dynamic hedging during a
currency crisis, for example, derivatives markets become very illiquid and it
is likely that intermediaries will hedge forwards and options in the underlying
cash markets. The implication is that this type of hedging activity will have an
immediate impact on cash markets that is certain to put additional stress on the
price of the weak currency. This pressure is higher for forward contracts than
for options at the beginning of the life of the contract, but will tend to be similar
as it becomes obvious that the options will end in-the-money. Dynamic hedging
also implies that traders have to buy the underlying asset when prices are high
and sell when prices are low. This behavior can make particularly difficult to
defend a fixed exchange rate with high interest rates since the underlying asset
is the weak currency.
Margin and collaterals volatility also increases because, in particular for
exchange-traded derivatives, increase in time of high volatility and this may
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give rise to liquidity problems for some market participants, that could end up
causing large losses with systemic consequences.
While most of the effects discussed above seem to impair the operational
ability of the central bank to conduct effectively monetary policies, there is
some casual evidence that the existence of derivative markets may also have
effects working in the opposite direction by reducing the volatility of the money
demand (although it makes it more difficult to define the relevant monetary
aggregate). This is so because derivatives transform non-money financial
assets, which bear market and credit risk, into closer substitutes for traditional
(risk-free) money. For example, a long position in a stock plus a short forward
replicates the pay-off of a term deposit (a component of M2). If households and
firms maintain precautionary money balances to deal with unexpected events,
access to derivatives markets would tend to reduce the volatility of these
precautionary balances and the overall volatility of money demand should
decline as well. Reducing the volatility of velocity could, make projections
more accurate and in addition would also increase central bank control over
the money supply.13
C. The Use of Derivatives by Central Banks
Derivatives enable a central bank to extent support of the domestic currency
beyond the current level of gross reserves. Because interventions in derivatives
markets have no material impact on the central bank’s balance sheet, this
prevents potential problems of sterilization associated with more traditional
forms of intervention. But since the levels of reserves pose no constraint on
derivative markets (unless counterparties do), the potential losses for the
central bank can be heavier than they would otherwise be.
Central bank intervention may have some additional problems: if viewed
as a signaling device, the use of derivatives may be perceived as a way of
13 Notice that this effect can also work to reduce the overall level of the money demand,
requiring an equivalent reduction in the outstanding stock to preserve equilibrium.
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postponing difficult decisions. In addition, central bank intervention through
derivatives may lead to a reduction in the ability of derivatives contracts to
reflect market sentiment and provide accurate information.
It has to be recognized that, in certain circumstances, central bank
engagement in forward exchange rate operations (as well as in other
derivatives’ operations) could probably fulfill a positive function in completing
markets and reducing perceptions of risk. But as the central bank enters in a
forward contract, it gets exposed to losses should the domestic interest rate
rises. Moreover, the risk of high losses increases with the volatility of the
foreign interest rate and of the sovereign risk (if interest parity holds in some
manner). Thus, forward transactions should only be undertaken, if at all, in
conditions of stable international environment and if they can indeed convince
speculators about the central bank commitment to defend the exchange rate (or
the price of the underlying asset that is being defended). But if agents still bet
against the fixed exchange rate and certainty is not restored, this would lead
to higher and more variable domestic interest rates. In such cases the forward
transaction impacts on the solvency of the central bank and raises the
probability of currency crisis.
V. Concluding Remarks
It has been widely accepted that central banks should be independent and
focussed on achieving price stability. However, their functions could not be
effectively discharged if attention is not permanently directed to the evolution
and development of the surrounding environment. Even if inflation has been
defeated, it is incumbent to central banks to strive for price stability. There is
even merit in pursuing a price level-rather than inflationary-objective. Of
course, in this case policy would have to offset past deviations of prices from
the established path but this tends to reduce uncertainty about prices over the
long run.14
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To achieve its price stability objective the central bank must ensure a sound
financial system, a necessary condition for an efficient monetary transmission
mechanism. The objective of safeguarding the soundness of the financial
system is mutually consistent with the goal of price stability but the central bank
should contain its role to these aspects that the market cannot effectively
address. Avoiding systemic risks without giving rise to moral hazard is
probably the most difficult balancing act that confronts the monetary authority.
The pursue of stabilizing monetary policy has been rendered more
complicated by financial engineering. The growth of derivative markets and
its implications for macroeconomic policies in general--and for monetary
policies in particular--is still in uncharted territory. At the minimum, it has
become more difficult to predict with full certainty the consequences of
specific monetary policy actions. In the extreme, monetary policy strategies
could be totally altered by the rapid market developments. The extreme,
however, may not be an unlikely scenario.
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